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Word Gems
exploring self-realization, sacred personhood, and full humanity
Dr. Mortimer J. Adler's
Six Great Ideas
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Discussions of truth as objective or subjective, as fixed and immutable versus matters of personal taste, lead us to the realms of goodness and beauty.
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Editor's note:
Excerpts from Six Great Ideas are offered below, indented format; plus, at times, my own commentary.
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From Truth to Goodness and Beauty
Of these three great ideas, truth is sovereign as, in the case
of the second trio, justice is the governing idea in relation to
liberty and equality.
Matters that we have come to understand better through our
consideration of truth—the distinction between judgments
having certitude and judgments in the realm of doubt, the dis-
tinction between the sphere of truth and the sphere of taste—
lay the ground for a better understanding of goodness and
beauty.
We have faced the question about the subjective aspect of
truth and its relation to the objective aspect; and we have seen
why the objective aspect is primary and controlling. This will
guide us in dealing with similar questions about goodness
and beauty, questions that we will find more insistent and
more difficult.
Was the skeptical Montaigne correct when he said that there
is nothing good or evil but thinking makes it so? Are people
generally right in saying that beauty exists only in the eye of
the beholder?
Is there no objective aspect of goodness or beauty? Can some
of our judgments about what is good and evil, or about what is
right and wrong, be placed in the sphere of truth, leaving others in the sphere of taste? What is the basis for allocating them
in this way?
Are the objective and subjective aspects of beauty so inseparably fused that it is impossible, in the case of beauty, to separate what is a matter of truth from what is a matter of taste?
Does the maxim De gustibus non disputandum est apply without
exception to all judgments about goodness and beauty; or do
some fall under the maxim De veritate disputandum est?
The milder forms of skepticism that I have called subjectivism
and relativism are rampant not only in the popular mind but
also in academic circles, especially among sociologists and
other behaviorial scientists and even among philosophers. I
think I have shown how they can be combated with regard to
truth. I hope I shall be able to persuade readers that the mistakes of subjectivism and relativism can also be corrected with
regard to goodness.
The importance of doing so should be obvious. If all our
judgments about good and evil, right and wrong, are purely
subjective; if they are simply expressions of emotional preference; if there is no point in resorting to rational argument when
we find ourselves in conflict with others about such matters,
the practical consequences are far-reaching and pervasive. They
impinge upon the conduct of our personal and public lives at
every turn.
Subjectivism and relativism with regard to beauty are much
less amenable to correction than with regard to goodness. For-
tunately, it is also less important to overcome them there, at
least so far as their practical effect upon our lives is concerned.
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