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Word Gems 

exploring self-realization, sacred personhood, and full humanity

Dr. Mortimer J. Adler's 

Six Great Ideas

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The Realm of Doubt

When should we say, "I know," and do so with complete
assurance? When, after expressing a judgment, are we war-
ranted in adding, "This is something that I know beyond the
shadow of a doubt"?

When instead, with something less than complete assurance
and yet not without some basis for our judgment, should we
say, "I believe," "I think," "I have the opinion that . . ." or use
such phrases as "in my judgment" or "in my opinion"? When,
after expressing a judgment, should we add the comment,
"This is something I have reason to believe is true"?

The criteria for drawing the line that divides the realm of
certitude from the realm of doubt can be stated abstractly. As
so stated, the criteria are not difficult to understand. Difficulties
arise only when we try to apply these criteria to particular cases
in an attempt to decide which of our judgments belong in the
realm of certitude and which in the realm of doubt.

The criteria are as follows. A judgment belongs in the realm
of certitude when it is of the sort that

(1) cannot be challenged by the consideration of new evidence that results from additional or improved observations, nor

(2) can it be criticized by improved reasoning or the detection of inadequacies or errors in the reasoning we have done. Beyond challenge or criticism, such judgments are indubitable, or beyond doubt.

In contrast, a judgment is subject to doubt if there is any
possibility at all

(1) of its being challenged in the light of additional or more accurate observations or

(2) of its being criticized on the basis of more cogent or more comprehensive reasoning.

Let me illustrate this by reference once again to judicial proof
in a jury trial of issues of fact. In criminal prosecutions, the
degree of proof required is defined as being “beyond a reasonable doubt." But this does not take the verdict rendered by the
jury out of the realm of doubt.

What the jury is asked to bring in is a verdict that they have
no reason to doubt—no rational basis for doubting—in the
light of all the evidence offered and the arguments presented
by opposing counsel.

It always remains possible that new evidence may be forth-
coming and, if that occurs, the case may be reopened and a new
trial may result in a different verdict. It also remains possible
for the verdict to be appealed to a higher court on the grounds
of procedural errors that affected the weighing of the evidence
in the deliberations of the jury.

The original verdict may have been beyond a reasonable
doubt at the time it was made, but it is not indubitable—not
beyond all doubt or beyond the shadow of a doubt—precisely
because it can be challenged by new evidence or set aside by
an appeal that calls attention to procedural errors that may have
invalidated the jury's deliberations—the reasoning they did in
weighing and interpreting the evidence presented.

In civil litigation, the degree of proof required is defined as
being "by a preponderance of the evidence." Here the jury's
verdict claims no more than that the answer it gives to a ques-
tion of fact has greater probability than the opposite answer.
 

As the jurors have interpreted and weighed the evidence, they
have found that it tends to favor one answer rather than another. Here, as in a criminal prosecution, additional evidence
or better thinking on the jury's part might result in a different
verdict. The balance might shift in the opposite direction.

In the affairs of daily life, many of the judgments we make
are, like jury verdicts, beyond a reasonable doubt or are favored
by a preponderance of the evidence. For all practical purposes,
we regard judgments of the first sort as being so highly probable that we act on them as if they were certain. We need not hesitate to act on them even though new evidence may be forthcoming in the future or a flaw in our thinking may be discovered.

In the light of all the evidence we have before us and the
thinking we have done, we have no reason at present to doubt
the truth of such judgments. But we should always remember
that that does not make them indubitable; that does not give
them the kind of certitude that removes them from the realm of
doubt.

The essential difference between genuine certitude and the
substitute for it that is often called "moral certainty" or "practical certainty" lies in the finality and incorrigibility of indubitable judgments.

Even when we act on a highly probable judgment as if it were a certainty for all practical purposes, it remains a judgment that is subject to correction, to challenge, and to criticism. It is one about which we may in the future think it reasonable to change our minds.

In a wide variety of daily affairs—in the conduct of family
life, in the care of our bodies and in all matters of health and
disease, in our business or professional careers, in our financial
dealings, especially in making investments, in our political decisions, especially with regard to foreign policy and international relations—we frequently act on judgments that are not beyond a reasonable doubt, but are simply more probable than their opposites.

In the light of the evidence available at the time
and in the light of the best thinking we have done so far, we
regard them as more likely to be true.

The critical caution we must exercise is contained in the
words "at the time" and "so far." These words remind us that
the future always holds the possibility of additional evidence
and better thinking, either of which may shift the weight of
probability in the opposite direction.

The realm of doubt is the realm of judgments that have a
future, for better or for worse. This is not so in the case of
judgments that have the finality and incorrigibility of certitude.