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Word Gems 

exploring self-realization, sacred personhood, and full humanity

Dr. Mortimer J. Adler's 

Six Great Ideas

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When, wanting something, I call it good, the statement that
the object wanted appears good to me is a statement primarily
about me and about the object only in relation to me. Unless
you suspect that I am trying to deceive you about my desire in
this instance, you will accept my statement as true.

You may, however, challenge it by telling me that what appears good to me is not really good, but the very opposite. You would then be making a statement about the object, not about me, a statement the truth of which you and I might reasonably argue about.

If I call something beautiful because I derive pleasure simply
from beholding or contemplating it, that statement is also a
statement primarily about me and about the object only in re-
lation to me. Eliminating any suspicion of deception on my
part, you will accept my statement as true.

Here, however, you cannot challenge it by telling me that the
object in which I find beauty is not really enjoyable by me, but
the very opposite. You may say that it gives you no pleasure to
contemplate it, but this difference of opinion between us is a
difference in taste that is not worth arguing about.

If the beautiful is identified with the enjoyable—with that
which affords us the kind of enjoyment that is the purely dis-
interested pleasure derived from contemplating the object—
there is no escaping the conclusion we have reached that beauty
lies entirely in the eye of the beholder and is merely a matter of
taste. But there is another sense in which, when we call an
object beautiful, we are speaking about the object itself, and
not about ourselves or about the object in relation to us.

We call the object beautiful because it has certain properties
that make it admirable. It has those properties whether or not
its having them results in its being enjoyable by you or me. If
the admirable were universally enjoyable, then beautiful ob-
jects would always be subjectively experienced as beautiful
also; that is, everyone would derive pleasure or enjoyment from
contemplating them. But that is not the case, as everyone
knows.

What remains to be seen, however, is whether there is any
relation between the admirability of the object and its enjoya-
bility by individuals differing in their temperaments, sensibil-
ities, nurture, and culture. It should be noted, in any case, that
admiration is just as much an expression of taste as enjoy-
ment is; but with one difference. Enjoyment is immediate.
Admiration may be mediated by thought and dependent
upon knowledge.

The properties that make an object admirable have been var-
iously named by writers about beauty.

Aristotle wrote, "To be beautiful, a living creature, and every
whole made up of parts, must not only present a certain order
in its arrangement of parts, but also be of a certain definite
magnitude. Beauty is a matter of size and order. . . ."

Aquinas said that the beautiful object is one that has unity,
proportion, and clarity. It is a complex whole having parts.
When the parts are so organized and proportioned to one an-
other that the complex structure of its wholeness is perspicuous
or manifest (i.e., not obscured by any discordant or inharmon-
ious element), the object thus constituted is beautiful. It is ad-
mirable for its intrinsic excellence or perfection.

Children used to be taught that in order to write a good
composition, one that has intrinsic excellence or perfection,
they should try to produce one that has unity, clarity, and co-
herence. In carpentry shops, they were, and still may be, taught
that to make a good chair or table, they have to put the parts
together in a way that produces a well-organized whole in
which the parts are properly proportioned to one another. A
poorly made chair may not be useful in serving the purpose for
which chairs are made; but, quite apart from the question of its
usefulness, a poorly made chair is not admirable. It lacks the
perfection or intrinsic excellence of a well-made chair.

What has just been said about pieces of writing and products
of carpentry applies to all works of human art—all man-made
objects. Some may be made for use, as chairs and tables are.
Some may be made for the enjoyment of contemplators, as
poems, statues, paintings, and symphonies are. Some may be
made for both use and enjoyment, as buildings are.

Sometimes an object made for use may become one that is
contemplated with enjoyment, as a fine piece of furniture roped
off in a museum. Sometimes an object made for enjoyment by
contemplators may become one that is used for some practical
purpose, as a painting hung to cover a stain on the wall.

But, regardless of the purpose for which it is made, how it is
made, or how it is employed, anything that a human being
makes is either well made or poorly made. It either has or lacks
the intrinsic excellence or perfection that is appropriate to that
kind of thing. It either is admirable or not.

If we turn from works of art to the things of nature, we speak
of those that have intrinsic excellence or perfection as being
well formed, not well made. Striking deformities are to be
found among all living things. Horticulturists root out de-
formed growths or try to correct them. Animal breeders elimi-
nate from the breeding process the less well formed in order to
produce more perfect specimens of the kind in question.

At flower shows and dog or cat shows, judges award blue
ribbons or gold medals to the best of kind or breed—the rose
or orchid, the dog or cat that is more admirable for its intrinsic
excellence or perfection as that kind of living organism. The
winning specimen is declared to possess all the qualities that
an individual instance of that kind should have, and to be de-
void of any blemishes or flaws.

The beautiful as the admirable is the same in works of art
and the things of nature. In both spheres, the object admired
as beautiful possesses an intrinsic excellence or perfection that
is appropriate to that kind of thing, whether a product of nature
or of art. The only difference is that in the sphere of art, we
speak of the admirable as the well-made; in the sphere of nature, we speak of it as the well-formed.

It may be pointed out that the flowers, dogs, or cats exhibited
at shows or fairs are not purely products of nature, since human
effort has intervened to achieve the perfection of breeding or
development that may win a prize. That, however, does not
affect the point under consideration. The admirable perfection
of the well-formed organism is often found in nature untouched
by human hands.

Acquiescing in everything that has been said so far, the
reader may interpose questions that certainly deserve to be
asked. Who says what is admirable or not? The judgment that
an object is admirable for its intrinsic excellence or perfection
may be a judgment about the object itself, about the properties
it possesses, but does that make the judgment objective rather
than subjective? Is it a judgment that has objective truth—one
that belongs in the sphere of truth rather than in the sphere of
taste and so one that is worth arguing about to get at the truth
of the matter?

To the first question—Who says what is admirable?—the an-
swer has already been indicated. It is the English teacher, not
the student, who judges whether the composition turned in has
the unity, clarity, and coherence required for the production of
a well-made piece of writing. It is the carpentry instructor, not
the student, who judges whether or not the table or chair
turned out in shop is admirable for the intrinsic excellence of a
well-made chair or table. So, too, in all exhibits of living organ-
isms in which entries compete for prizes, the awards are made
by experts selected for their competence as judges to determine
the most admirable or beautiful of the specimens exhibited.

The judgment about the beauty of an object in terms of its
admirability for intrinsic excellence or perfection is the judg-
ment of an expert, with special knowledge and skill in judging
specimens of a certain kind. One would not ask the English
teacher to judge the products of the carpentry shop, or the car-
pentry instructor to judge English compositions. One would
not ask the judges selected for a dog or cat show to judge the
roses or orchids exhibited at a flower show.

This is not to say that the experts cannot disagree. They often
do, and the awards are, therefore, made by averaging the
points given the objects by a panel of judges. The spectators
may also disagree with the final results, thinking that the spec-
imen awarded second place is more admirable than the one
given the blue ribbon or gold medal as the most beautiful object
of its kind. But there is a difference between the disagreement
of the experts with one another and the disagreement between
the laymen and the experts.

The skilled judges can argue reasonably with one another
about the points scored by the specimens under consideration;
it is quite possible for such argument to result in a change of
opinion and an altered final result. But the layman cannot argue
with the judges in a way that might persuade them to change
their minds. If he could, he would be an expert himself, not a
layman.

In the sphere of the fine arts—the arts called, in French and
German, the arts of the beautiful—there are also expert judges
and mere laymen who lack the knowledge and skill possessed
by the expert in a particular field of art. The persons who are
acknowledged literary or musical critics, or connoisseurs of
painting and sculpture, may differ more frequently or more
radically in their opinions about the admirable beauty of a par-
ticular work than do the judges at flower, dog, or cat shows.
But it still remains the case that they are in a position to argue
reasonably with one another, with the hope that one can per-
suade another to change his opinion, whereas mere laymen
cannot argue with them, either reasonably or fruitfully.

Is, then, the judgment of beauty that is based on the admir-
ability of an object for its intrinsic excellence or perfection a
matter of truth or a matter of taste? The answer depends on
how we answer another question. Does the distinction that is
generally acknowledged between the mere laymen and the
skilled, knowledgeable expert in a particular field carry with it
acknowledgment of a difference between inferior and superior
taste?

Must it not be the case that to have superior taste is to have
the ability to perceive correctly the superiority of one object
over another for its intrinsic excellence or perfection? What
would superior taste mean if the person having it could not
make a reasonable and well-grounded judgment about which
of two objects was the more admirable?

In short, must we not conclude that, though judgments about
the admirable beauty of objects are expressions of taste on the
part of those who make such judgments, expert judges have
superior taste that enables them to rank objects correctly in a
way that accords with the degree to which they possess intrin-
sic excellence or perfection?

That conclusion has two corollaries. The first is that, while
judgments of the admirable beauty of objects are expressions of
taste, they are also judgments that can have a certain measure
of objective truth—judgments about which reasonable and
profitable argument can occur among experts. De gustibus non disputandum est does not apply to the experts in a particular
field.

The second corollary is that the degrees of admirable beauty
attributed to objects is objective, not subjective; that is, it per-
tains to the condition of the object, not to the state of mind or
feeling of the subject making the judgment. If one object were
not in its intrinsic properties superior to another, the person
who judged it as the more admirable could not be said to have
superior taste as compared with the person who made the op-
posite judgment. Only if there are gradations of excellence or
perfection in the objects themselves, making one more admi-
rable than another, can there be gradations in the scale of taste,
making expert judges superior to laymen and, even among ex-
perts, making one judge superior to another.

Those who hold the view that beauty is objective rather than
subjective go further and assert a third corollary; namely, that
the more admirable or beautiful an object is in itself, the more
enjoyable it must be universally —to all human beings at all
times and places and under all circumstances of nurture and
culture. What is objectively beautiful because of its admirable
intrinsic excellence or perfection must also be subjectively
beautiful, enjoyable or pleasing to all who behold or contemplate it.

The view just set forth cannot be defended. The objective and
subjective aspects of beauty are not correlated. That which, in
the judgment of experts in a particular field, may be admirable
beauty in an object is not always and uniformly enjoyable. It
may please one individual who contemplates it, and not another. In fact, to acknowledge that some individuals are persons
of poor or uncultivated taste is to recognize that they are
likely to enjoy less rather than more admirable objects.

If a person's taste can be cultivated and improved with regard
to a certain kind of object, the individual is more likely to enjoy
objects that, in the judgment of experts, are more admirable.
But this does not alter the basic fact that enjoyable beauty is
one thing and admirable beauty another.

The individual who derives disinterested pleasure from the
contemplation of objects that lack intrinsic excellence or perfec-
tion, or have an inferior degree of it, is thoroughly justified in
regarding such objects as beautiful because they provide the
enjoyment appropriate to calling them beautiful. They have for
that individual the beauty of the enjoyable even if they lack the
beauty of the admirable in the judgment of experts, or persons
of superior taste.

Because there are these two distinct senses in which objects
can be called beautiful (as admirable and as enjoyable), beauty
has both an objective and a subjective dimension. The trouble
is that the two dimensions do not run parallel to one another.

Much of the confusion that is prevalent in discussions of
beauty comes from not recognizing this fact. The person who
calls an object beautiful because he enjoys it is often interpreted
as meaning that it is also admirable because of its intrinsic
excellence or perfection. That individual often misinterprets his
own expression of subjective taste as possessing an objective
significance that it does not have.

Many of us as laymen in a given field would like to think that
an object that pleases us should be equally enjoyable to others.
We often go so far as to say that they ought to enjoy what we
enjoy. Expert judges in a given field of objects are even more
disposed to say that everyone ought to enjoy the objects they
judge more admirable for the beauty of their intrinsic excellence
or perfection, or at least to recommend that everyone's taste
ought to be cultivated and improved to the point where they
would find the more admirable also more enjoyable.

Prescriptive oughts do not apply to enjoyment. No one can
tell another person what he ought or ought not to enjoy, as one
can tell another what he ought or ought not to desire (because
it is really good or really bad); or as one person can tell another
what he ought or ought not to affirm as true (because evidence
and reasoning support the proposition in question rather than
its opposite, either beyond the shadow of a doubt, or beyond a reasonable doubt, or by a preponderance of evidence and rea-
sons in its favor).

The only ought that would seem to be admissible in the
sphere of the enjoyable is one that is an educational prescrip-
tion. We think that education should result in the formation of
a mind that thinks as it ought, judging correctly about the truth
and falsity of propositions. We think that education should
result in the formation of a virtuous moral character, one that
desires aright or chooses as it ought with regard to good and
evil. To carry this one step further, from the spheres of truth
and goodness to the sphere of beauty, we need only say that
education should result in the formation of good taste so that
the individual comes to enjoy that which is admirable, and to
derive more enjoyment from objects that have greater intrinsic
excellence or perfection. Beyond this one cannot go. One cannot
prescribe what everyone ought to find enjoyable because of its
admirable intrinsic properties.

Not only must we acquiesce in the relativity of enjoyable
beauty to the taste of the individual at whatever level of culti-
vation it may be. We must also recognize that enjoyable beauty
is relative to the cultural circumstances of the individual as well
as to his innate temperament and his nurture. Peoples of
diverse cultures differ radically with respect to the objects in
which they find enjoyable beauty. A Westerner in Japan may
be left cold in the presence of a Zen garden or a Kabuki perfor-
mance that the Japanese contemplate for hours with rapt enjoy-
ment. A European may not find enjoyable beauty in African
sculpture, or an African in Western abstract painting.

The relativity of beauty to cultural differences extends from
enjoyable to admirable beauty. Those who have the expertness
to make them competent judges of Western painting may be
mere laymen when it comes to admiring Chinese or Japanese
screens. Even within the broad scope of Western culture, ex-
perts competent to judge classical sculptures or Byzantine mo-
saics may not have comparable competence when it comes to
admiring impressionist or postimpressionist paintings.

The person who says, as many do, "I do not know whether
that object is beautiful, but I know what I like, and I do like it,"
should understand himself to be acknowledging the disconnec-
tion between enjoyable and admirable beauty. He is, in effect,
saying, "I do not know what expert judges would think about
the intrinsic excellence or perfection of the object in question,
but I do know that it pleases me to behold or contemplate. It
may or may not be admirable in the judgment of experts, but I
enjoy it nevertheless."

There is one further difference to be noted between the expert
judgment of admirable beauty and the expression of taste for
enjoyable beauty, whether by experts or by laymen. It requires
us to recall Immanuel Kant's observation that the apprehension
of an object from which we derive disinterested pleasure is
nonconceptual. It is the apprehension or contemplation of that
individual object as such, not as a particular instance of one or
another kind of object.

Contrariwise, the expert judgment of the admirable beauty
of an object based on its intrinsic excellence or perfection can-
not be a judgment devoid of conceptual content because it is
always a judgment about the individual object, not as an indi-
vidual, but as a particular instance of a certain kind.

The knowledge that is involved in being an expert is knowl-
edge about the kind, specimens of which are being judged. The
skill of the expert is skill in discriminating the degrees of excel-
lence possessed by less and more admirable specimens of the
kind in question. That is why the person who is an expert judge
of Greek temples will probably not be an expert judge of Gothic
cathedrals, and why the person who is an expert judge of flow-
ers is unlikely to be an expert judge of dogs.

The objectivity of truth lies in the fact that what is true for an
individual who happens to be in error is not true at all. The
objectivity of goodness lies in the fact that what is called good
by an individual whose wants are contrary to his needs is not
really good for him or for anyone else. What is true for the
person whose judgment is sound ought to be regarded as true
by everyone else. What is good for the person whose desires
are right ought to be regarded as good by everyone else.

When we come to beauty, the parallelism fails. What is enjoy-
able beauty for the individual whose taste is poor and who
derives pleasure from inferior objects is really enjoyable beauty
for him regardless of what anyone else thinks, including the
experts. What is admirable beauty in the judgment of the ex-
perts may not be enjoyable beauty for many laymen; nor can
we say that they ought to admire as well as enjoy it because of
its intrinsic excellence. All we can say, perhaps, is that they
ought to learn to enjoy what is admirable.

At the bottom line, it remains the case that the enjoyable
belongs to the sphere of the subjective—a matter of individual
taste about which there is no point in arguing. The best wine
experts in the world may all agree that a certain red Bordeaux
of a certain vintage is a supreme specimen of claret. It does not
follow that an individual who prefers white wine to red, or
Burgundies to clarets, or has a taste for whiskey rather than for
wine, must necessarily enjoy drinking the wine accorded the
gold medal by the experts.

What is true of wines is true of everything else that, on the
one hand, can be judged for its admirable intrinsic excellence
and, on the other hand, may or may not give pleasure or enjoy-
ment to the taste of individuals.

One concluding observation. Readers who feel dissatisfied or
disappointed by what I have been able to say about admirable
beauty—the intrinsic excellence of objects judged admirable by
experts—have reason on their side. They are justified in ex-
pecting something more: a clear and precise statement of the
features shared in common by all instances of admirable
beauty, whether in nature or in works of art, and in any and
every sphere of art.

I sympathize with such dissatisfaction or disappointment. I
have suffered it myself. Expert judges in a given field of art may
be able to state the underlying principles or criteria of intrinsic
excellence in that sphere of workmanship. They seldom can do
so unanimously. But even if they were all to agree about the
objective criteria of admirable beauty in the field in which they
were experts, even if they all subscribed to principles by con-
formity to which a judgment concerning the admirable beauty
of a certain object could claim to be true, that would still be
insufficient.

More can be reasonably expected of the philosopher who
undertakes to deal with the idea of beauty. In dealing with the
ideas of truth and goodness, the philosopher discharges his
intellectual responsibility. He is able to tell us what truth and
goodness consist in, not in some particular domain, but uni-
versally. That intellectual responsibility the philosopher does
not seem able to discharge in dealing with the idea of beauty.

I would have wished to write this chapter in a philosophical
manner not disappointing to its readers, not failing to provide
the clear and precise statement about what beauty objectively
consists in, which they have good reason to expect. I have failed
for two reasons. One is that I am not able to find that clear and
precise statement in the literature of the subject. The other is
that I lack the insight or wisdom needed to supply it myself.

Disappointed readers must, therefore, convert their dissatis-
faction by transforming it into a challenge—to do for them-
selves what has yet to be done by anyone.

To do what? To say what is common to—what universal qualities are present in—the admirable beauty of a prize-winning rose, Beethoven's Kreutzer Sonata, a triple play in the ninth inning of a baseball game, Michelangelo's Pieta, a Zen garden, Milton's sonnet on his blindness, a display of fireworks, and so on.